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Abstract and Headnote:
This paper develops a dynamic model of duopoly behavior in order to
investigate rational-expectations solutions to the duopoly problem. In the
paper it is shown that there are multiple rational-expectations solutions,
including the Cournot equilibrium, provided no adjustment costs are present.
If adjustment costs occur, the Cournot solution cannot be a rational-expec-
tations one, but multiple solutions still occur. Furthermore, the presence
of adjustment costs provide a rationale as to why firms are not always in
equilibrium and thus allow for a true dynamic solution to the duopoly
problem. The analysis also treats the case of more than two firms.
Dynamic Duopoly Theory and Rational Expectations
The determination of equilibrium prices and quantities in an oligopo
listic market has been a troublesome problem for economic theory# The
intrinsic nature of the problem is the interdependence of firms - the profit
level of any firm depends upon not only aggregate demand and its own output
level, but also on the output level of other firms. Thus, each firm, in
choosing its own output level, needs to make some behavioral assumption —or
conjecture - about how other firms will respond to these changes in output.
Each of the various equilibrium concepts formulated for the duopoly
problem differs in terms of the assumed conjectural variations, and each has
been criticized on some ground. The Cournot model yields an equilibrium
which is consistent in the sense that firms' conjectures about output levels
of other firms are correct —in equilibrium. Yet, the Cournot model has
been criticized, because the assumption of a zero conjectural variation is
inconsistent with the firm's reaction function; in essence, the model is
consistent in equilibrium but not out of equilibrium.
Recent models of duopoly behavior have focused attention on the role of
the conjectural variation. Clearly, to each set of conjectures, there is a
corresponding output/price equilibrium. Yet, the basic qviestion seems to
be —where did these conjectures come from? The emphasis on rational
expectations in economic modelling seems to make it clear that a consistent
framework requires that the conjectures assumed by firms about the behavior
of other firms be consistent with the actual (or likely) behavior of those
firms. Professor Timothy Bresnahan (1981), in a recent paper, presents a
model in which he claims these conjectures are consistent - i.e., in which
the conjectures made by one firm are equal to the actual reaction of the
other firm.
However;, one difficulty in all models of duopoly behavior concerns the
timing of decisions. If each firm must supply its output to the market at
the same time, how can an unanticipated change in the output of one firm
affect the current output level of other firms? Clearly, it is the antici
pated level of output of other firms which is crucial in determining, the
current behavior of a firm. On the other hand, even if current output
variations of one firm have no effect oh the current output level of other
firms, they may change the expectations these firms have concerning the
future output level of that first firm. It would seem that what is needed
is some explicit time framework in which these distinctions can be made
clearer.
It is the purpose of this paper to develop a dynamic model of oligopoly
behavior in which expectations are formed rationally. In the first section
of this paper, we present a brief review of the approach used by Bresnahan
and others. In the second section, we present a dynamic programming model
in which one firm derives its optimal decision rule, given its expectations
concerning the behavior of the other firms. The third section shows how the
sjnnmetric rational expectations
multiple solutions. It is also
rational expectations solutions.
solutions are derived, assuming there are no
adjustment costs associated with output changes. One of the results that
emerges is the multiplicity of rational expectations solutions; thus,
rational expectations alone do not solve the basic duopoly problem of
seen that the Cournot solution is one of the
In the fourth section we consider the role
of adjustment costs. We see that multiple solutions still exist for this
case; however, the Cournot solution is no longer a rational expectations
solution. Thus, the Cournot solution may be viewed as a singular one cor
responding to a case in which output can be varied instantaneously; as such,
there is never a reason to be out of equilibrium. The fifth section shows
how the model can be extended to deal with more than two firms# Finally, we
conclude with suggestions for future work.
I) Consistent Conjectures and Duopoly Equilibrium
As noted in the introduction, the duopoly equilibrium depends upon the
conjectures made by each firm concerning the behavior of the other firm.
Let us assume x^e have two producers of a homogeneous product, with given
market demand. We will label the firms 1 and 2, and assume that each firm
uses quantities as its choice variable. Following Bresnahan, let:
(1) P = P(Q); Q - qjL + q2
where P(Q) is the inverse demand function, 0 is total output, and q^ is the
output of firm i. Let each firm's cost function be given by that
firm i's profits are:
(2) TT^ = P(0)q^ - C^(q^)
Firm i, in choosing its (perceived) optimal output, q*, needs to make some
assumption about the behavior of firm j. From firm i*s perspective, assume
that its beliefs about the behavior of firm j are summarized by the
function:
(3) = ^^ij^^i' "j^» i j
In (3), q^ represents i's belief about how firm j behaves; it need not
represent the "truth"; q^ is the actual output of i, and summarizes
factors that i believes are external to its own behavior. For simplicity.
(3) can be specialized to:
(4) q® =
where Kj is firm j*s "autonomous" output. Define:
(5) = (^qj/^q^) =
Following Bresnahan, r^^ is i*s conjectural variation. Using (3) or (5) in
(2) yields:
where ir^ represents the profit firm i expects to earn, given its output, q^,
and its beliefs about the behavior of firm j. Optimizing (6) over q^
yields:
(7) (dir^/dq^) = P(0) + q^P* (Q) [1+ ] - C^(q^) = 0.
(7) serves to determine firm i's perceived optimal output, , given r^^ and
© e
q.. Note, however, that it is not methodologically legitimate to treat q.
J _ • ^
as exogenous, since the derivation of (7) presupposes its endogeneity.
Thus, (7) implicity determines q*, given the market demand function, firm
i's cost curve, and firm i's beliefs about firm j's behavior. While super
ficially it seems to determine q* as, a function of r^^^ and q? - and, hence to
define i's reaction function as dependent on q^ - it cannot consistently be
so interpreted because of the endogeneity of q.. If we assume that is
separable (as in (4)) and that r^j is a constant, then we can write:
(8) q* = h.(a^ » r..)
where ct^ represents the portion of j's output that i believes is autonomous
to i's action, and Is i's conjectural-variation.
Similarly, from firm j's perspective, let its beliefs about the
behavior of i be described by:
(9) =g.,(qj, ap =g.^(q.) + ; r.^ ^ g',(q.)
where we assume that the function is separable. Thus, j's conjectural
variation is given by r^^ and, following Breshahan, may be assumed to be a
constant. Hence, from j's perspective^•profits are given by:
(10) ''i^^j* ^i^^ " ~
Optimizing (10) over , given (9), yields:
(11) (d7r?/dq.) - P(0) + q P'(Q)(1 + r ) - C' (q ) = 0
J ^ J J J J
^ 01 6
As for (7), (11) determines q. given r.., q^; but since is assumed to be
3 J ^
endogenous, it cannot be said to 'determine a reaction function for firm j.
Clearly, (7) and (11) can be solved simultaneously to yield the
equilibrium (^*j ^2^* given the conjectural variations, as well as demand
and cost parameters. And the values of ) can always be determined
A 0such that output conjectures are consistent - i.e., such that ''j ~ ''j ~
(rijq* + j) where q^ is j's actual output, and q^ is i*s belief about j's
output. For example, if we let:^
(12) P=A- BQ; C^(qj^) = q^, then;
assuming,, for simplicity, c^ ~ ^j 1~ *^1' *^12 ~ *^12 ~ ^2* find:
(13) q* = (A - Cj)[B(l + + c^]/A; x,k = i,j; x ^ k,
(14) A=B^[3 +2(r^^ +r^^) + ^2 ^ij ^ji^
-k = < - ^xk< = {(A - cp[B(l - r..r.p + c^d - ^ ^
The problem arises, however, in defining what is meant by consistent
or rational - conjectures. As noted earlier, one cannot think of (7) as
determining a reaction function for firin i - firm i's (subjective) optimal
output does not depend on q., since i thinks q. is endogenous. Rather, q^
J J
depends on a. and r..; how, then, can one derive from (7) a reaction
3 J
function that is consistent with (9)? Furthermore, if i believes that it
determines j's current output (since the term presumably captures demand
and cost conditions which are unchanging), and j believes it determines i s
current output, how can they both be correct?
Furthermore, there seems to be a problem of timing. If both firms
bring their output to the market simultaneously, then any unanticipated
change in the output of firm j will have no (current) effect on i*s output.
On the other hand, if each changes its (announced) output ex ante, we are
back to the same basic dilemma - how can each believe it determines the
other's output, and how can both be correct?
I would suggest that a more fruitful way of looking at the problem
would be in an explicit dynamic framework. Specifically, each firm may
believe its output has no current effect on the output of the other firm but
does change that other firm's future output as the latter firm revises its
expectations concerning the future output level of the former firm. Thus, a
dynam^ic framework can allow more explicitly for Interactions between firms
and can provide a basis for a rational expectations solution to the duopoly
problem. . We now turn to construct a simple dynamic model of the duopoly
•problem.
II) The Dynamic Framework
We assume Chat there are two firms, each producing an identical
product. The firms are labelled 1 and 2, and their output at time t is q
respectively. Total market demand is unchanging over- time and is given
by:
(16) =A- B(O^); 0*^ = (qj +q^) •
Total costs of firm i at time t depend on its output at time t and, if
adjustment costs are present, depend on its output at (t-l). For
simplicity, we assume the total cost function is quadratic:
(17) cj = (= ^
The term involving adjustment costs may be motivated by extra costs entailed
(beyond simple factor payments) in changing labor employment or the capital
stock. There is, of course, a large literature on the role of adjustment
costs•
Each firm is assumed to choose its output (plan) in order to (i^ximize
the present discounted value of profits over its planning horizon. The
essence of the duopoly problem is that the profits of firm i depend on- the
behavior of firm j and that firm i may perceive its ability to influence
firm j. However, in order to avoid the simultaneity problem in which each
firm attempts to control the current output of the other firm (with its own
current output level), we assume that the current output level of the
competing firm is taken as exogenous. As discussed earlier, it is firm i's
beliefs about the output of firm j - not the actual output of j - that will
influence i*s current decision. Instead, we assume that each firm believes
it can, through its own current output decision, influence the future output
of the other firm. Specifically, from firm i's perspective, it believes j's
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output is governed by the following equation:
(18) Qj F aj + <).
For the moment, (18) is strictly an ad hoc representation of i's
beliefs; these beliefs may be correct or incorrect. Later, we shall'deal
with the issue of rational expectations.
I
At time t, firm i chooses to maximize the present discounted value
of profits over the planning horizon, which is given by:
(19) V^(q^. q^) =(p'^ qj - cj) + qj)
In (19), 6 is the discount rate, and is the maximum present discounted
^ Xvalue of profits, starting at (t+1). Note thafV^.^^ depends upon q^
since - at (t+1) - the jth firm's (then) current output is taken as
exogenous; also, it will depend upon q^ if adjustment costs are present.
Naturally, the form of will also depend upon how (firm 1 believes) firm
j's output (for T > t+1) is determined - I.e., upon (18).
'fc
Due to the simple form of demand and cost functions, will be
quadratic. Assuming the planning horizon is infinite, the parameters of
^t+1 time independent. Thus, let be given by:
.(20) =Sq +s^q^ + s^(q^)(q^"^b - (s^/2)(qj"*"^^
Substituting for and from (16), (17) and (18) respectively, Into
(19) would give the objective function at t as a function of (qj, q^) and
the parameters of the demand, cost, and firm j output determination
equation. Optimizing (19) over qj^ given qj (and (16), (17),' (18), and
(20)) yields:
(2 1) OV|./3qJ) =[A - Bq^ - 2BqJ " - C^3(qJ - qj ^) ]
+6[OV*^j/9qJ) + (9V*_^^/9qj"'"b(8qj"^V3qJ)]
Using (18) and (20), and rearranging terms, yields:
(22) (9V^/3qJ) =h+ - KqJ - XqJ =0, where
(23) h = (A - c^j) + 5[s^ + e^s^ - aj(s^ + 0^s^)]
(24) KE [B + 64.j(s^ + 6jS^)]
(25) XE[2B +c^2 +^i3 + 2®j®4 Q^s^)]
The SOC requires X > 0
Given the values of s, and the other parameters, firm i*s optimal
decision rule is given by:
(26) (qp" =(h/X) + (c.3/X)q'"^ - (K/X)qj
However, since q^^ is taken by i to be exogenous and determined by (18), this
can be rewritten as:
(27) (qp'= ={[(h - ajK) +(c^j - 9jK)qJ"^ - (iq, .)q'^ " ^]7X}
Note that the form of the decision rule for i is comparable to that
postulated for j. Call this optimal rule:
(27a) (q-)*' = +
where ( , c})J, 0^) are determined from (27), and thus depend on all the
parameters. The parameters (s) can be recovered from (19) since, due to the
dt ^
infinite time horizon, will have the same form as
(28) V*(qj, qj"b = Max[Vj.(qJ, q^) ]
(q^
Thus, for example:
(29) OVi/aq";) = s, - s.q^"^ - = OV^/8q^) + (3V/3q!^) (3 (q J)"/3q')
tj ZhI jJ tj C1 1 J
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Since (9V^/3q^) = 0, we find:
(30) =-B(q|)*^ +Sls^- ~®5*'j"*"j
where is evaluated at (the optimal value), Similarly:
(3 1) O^VA/Caq^)^) =-s^ = - [B +6<^.(s^ +Q.s^)]Cd(q[)^/^qp
=-6S2(({>^) + (K^/X)
Proceeding similarly for the other partials, but omitting the tedious
calculations, yield s:
(32) 83(1 - 6<^p =-(K^/X)
(33) = (c^3K/X)
(34) S3 =C.3 - Cc^3/X)
(35) 82(1 - 5(t>j) = - (Kh/X)
(36) s j = (c^^h/x)
Note that = S3 = = 0 if 0^3 = 0; i.e., if no adjustment costs are
present, the only state variable is q^.
Given (B, 6, (J)., 6 c. -, and c..), equations (32) - (34) can be solved
J .1 i ^ ^
simultaneously for S3, s^, s^, and hence for (K,X), Thus, the interaction
parameters of i*s reaction function 8^ depend only on the discount rate,
the interaction parameters of j's reaction function, and the slopes of the
demand and marginal cost schedules; they do not depend on the intercepts of
these schedules. Finally, s^ s„, h and hence o.\ can be recovered from
J, X
(23), (27), (35) and (36), using the values of (S3, and s^).
To summarize, given any arbitrary values for j's reaction function of
the form:
(18) q^ - a. +
J 1 J J J i
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we have found i's optimal reaction function, contingent on its beliefs, in
the form:
(27a) (qp" =
where (0!, 6') depend on ((f> . , 9.), and a' depends on (a., <j) ., 6.); of
JO jjj
course, they all depend on the parameters of the demand and i's cost
schedules.
Proceeding similarly for j, we could assume j postulates i's reaction
function to be of the form:
(37) qj = "i +
Following a similar procedure to that outlined above, we could derive j's
optimal reaction function, which would be of the form:
(38) (qp'==a'.,'q-l +6:qr^
where (}) 1, 61 depend upon (tfi . , 9jt)» cc- depends upon 9^, a^); again,
J J J
they all depend on the parameters of the (common) demand function and on the
parameters of j's cost schedule.
By a rational expectations solution, we mean:
(39) 4.j(4.^, Oj^) = ♦^((fij, 0j) = 4>.
(40) 0J(4i^, 9^) = 0j; 0^(<t.j, 0.) = 0j
(41) aj(((ij^) 0j^. Oj^) = Oj; a|(((ij. 0.> Oj) =
That is, a rational-expectations solution is one in which each firm uses the
other's optimal reaction function in deriving its own reaction function.
Hence, the beliefs by each firm about the behavior of the other firm are
correct. We first turn to consider the case in which there are no
adjustment costs.
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HI) Rational Expectations Solution without Adjustment Costs
In the analysis that follows, we assume the firms are symmetric - i*e.,
that they possess identical cost schedules; thus, we drop the firm subscript
on the cost parameters.^ The fact that firms are symmetric does not imply
that the rational expectations solution must be symmetric. Indeed, even if
firms have identical cost curves, there will be an infinite set of rational-
expectations solutions, yielding different reaction functions and output
I
levels for the two firms. However, since these asymmetric solutions will
result in different profit levels for the two firms, it is not clear why the
firm with lower profit's would "psi^roit" such a solution. Thus, in the analy
sis that follows, we restrict ourselves to considering sjrmmetric rational
expectations solutions. Even for this case, multiple (but finite) solutions
occur.
Assuming = 0 and that solutions are symmetric implies:
(42) = ({)^ = .j); = 0^ = 6 ; sj = S3 = s^ = 0
From (27) and (28):
(43) = (-K/X)0j; ei = (-K/X)4.j
Hence, the set of solutions is given by:
(44) = ej = 0, or
(45) (K^/X^) = 1; = 6^
Note that the Cournot solution is a rational expectations solution
(corresponding to (44)). However, there are four other solutions (from
(4 5)), in which firms perceive the interaction between them. These
solutions for ((f), 6) may be found using (24), (2 5), (32), (43), and (45).
The corresponding values of a can be found using (23), (27), (3 5), and the
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solutions for (t|),e). These solutions are given below and are labelled (i)
(iv). Details are omitted to save space.
I/O
(46iV K = X > 0; -e^ = <|>^ = > 0; (})* = [(g-B)/26g]
(46ii) K = X > 0; -0^^ = = -(},*< 0
(46iii) -K = X> 0; = 4.^ > 0; <f.^ = [(g+B)/26g]
(46iv) -K = X > 0; 9^^ = < 0, where:
(47) g E (2B + C2) >. 2B,
The corresponding values for a(=aj=a^) are given by:
(48i) = (A - c^)(l - + B) - 64.*(g + 2B)]
(48ii) = (A - Cj)(l + 6(i)*)/[(g + B) + 6(t>*(g + 2B)]
(48iii) = -(A - - <5!})^) / [6tj)^gl
(48iv) = +(A - + ficj) ^) / [6(|)^g]
The corresponding steady-state output levels (q^ ~ obtained by
solving the reaction functions simultaneously. They are:
(49) > 0; q^^ = > 0
(50) = [a^^^/d - 2,},®)] > 0; q^"^ = [a^^/(l + 2$^)] >0
Making the appropriate substitutions for (|> yields:
(5U) = {(A - Cj)[M + N]/(T)} > 0
(51ii) = {(A - Cj)[M-N]/(T)} > 0
(52) MH(g^ + gB)(2 - «) + 25B^
(53) N E B[26g(g - B)J
(54) T Eg^(2 - 6) + Bg^(4 - 36) + 2gB2 + 46B^
Similarly, for = 6,
(55i) = [(A - Cj)(M® - N^)/(T®)] > 0
14
(5511) = [(A - Cj)(M® + > 0,
(56) = [(B + g)g] '^'^ 5 H3(26) '^'^
(57) T® = [2B + g(2 - 5)][g(B + g)l
As is apparent, the equilibrium output levels depend upon the discount
rate, 6, the slopes of the demand and marginal cost schedules, and the
difference between the intercepts of these schedules. Before discussing
these values in more detail, let us first consider the stability of the
system:
(58) = a + + 9qj
(59) qj " "
The characteristic roots (Xj, corresponding characteristic
vectors (dj, d^) are given by:
(60) Xj = (<^+0); 3^ = (dj, dj); = (<1) - 0); " ^^^2' "^2^
For this case of no adjustment costs, one root is always zero,'while the
other always exceeds one in absolute value.^ Thus, the system is
degenerate. While we expect a saddle-point solution to the rational-
expectations model, in this case there is no stable branch because of the
degeneracy. The only (symmetric) convergent solution is = q* for
all time. As we shall see, if adjustinent costs are present, we do get a
saddle-point solution.
Returning to the equilibrium output levels, consider first some
reference solutions. Denote by q , q and q the (individual firm) output
pc c m
solutions for the (static) competitive, Cournot, and joint-profit
maximization monopoly models respectively. Then:
t-1
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(61) q = [(A - c.)/g] > = [(A - c )/(g+B)] > = [(A - 0^/(26 + g)]
p C 1 ^
In order to compare our solutions to the above requires specifying the> value
of 6; assuming 6=1, we find:^
(62) ^ '1 '^" <''c ^ 'l" <"Ipc
In (62), > q unless c = 0; for c„ = 0, the solution q^ ((f) = -0 > 0)
p c ^ ^
corresponds to the Bertrand/Bresnahan solution. The corresponding
steady-state profits can be ordered as:
(63) TTj^j > ^ ^ >. ^ 0
where equality between holds for c^ = 0. Note, in the
above, we are discussing only variable profits - i»e., we ignore fixed
costs.
Furthermore, it is easily shown that as the discount rate increases (6
decreases) , each of the quantity solutions gets closer to the Cournot
solution. In other words, decreases in 6 cause q^ and q ** to increase,
while and q^ decrease. In the limit, as 6 0, all solutions tend to
the Cournot solution. By continuity, it follows that the stationary-state
profits corresponding to q^ and q^^ increase as 6 decreases, since output is
reduced towards the Cournot level. The profits corresponding to q fall,
since q^^ increases towards the Cournot level, whereas profits corresponding
to q^^^ first increase (as q^^^ tends to the monopoly solution), then
decrease.
If, somehow, the rational expectations solution were to be decided upon
by which one yielded the highest profits, then this choice would depend upon
the discount rate. Since q^ <q^^ <q^ for all 1_> 5>0, and (q^, q^^) >
q for ail 6 > 0, it follows that tt '^^ > and for all 6e(0,l).
^ c '
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For 6 = 1, we have seen ^ ^ > tt - However, as 6
decreases, falls, while initially increases. In particular, since
for.some 6', = q^. and for 6 < 6', follows
that there exists a 6* > 5' such that ^ as 6 ^ 6*. Thus, the
rational expectations solution which yields the highest profit level depends
on the discount rate.
Finally, one could ask what (static) conjectures correspond to each of
the rational expectations solution. First, note that for the dynamic
reaction function with c^ = Q:
(26) = (h/X) - (K/X)q^
Since (K^ = X^), the absolute value of the contemporaneous conjectural
i ii
variation is one. In particular, for K ~ X (q and q ), the conjecture is
-1, whereas for K= -X (q^^^ and q^^), that conjecture is 1. This, however,
is not equivalent to the static notion of a conjectural variation, since
each firm takes the other firm's contemporaneous output as given. The
static conjectures corresponding to each of our equilibrium output levels
can be found from the analysis of section I. Assuming symmetry, we find
from equation (13):
(61) q' = {(A - Cj)/[g + B(l+r)]}
Obviously, for the Cournot solution, the corresponding conjectural variation
is 0. Note that the competitive solution corresponds to a conjecture of
(-1), even if marginal cost is not constant, while the joint profit
maximizing solution corresponds to a conjecture of +1.
Since each of our four other rational expectations solutions depends
upon 6, the corresponding static conjectures will also depend upon S. Label
these conjectures (r^, ..., r^^), corresponding to (qq ), as
17
defined earlier. Then:
• 1 / *?
(62) r^ = - ^*)]l = [(6<1>*/(1 + ^*)]; = [(g-B)/26g]
(63) r^^^ = [6(i)®/(l-6<f.^)]; r^^ = -[6(^^/(l + 6(^^)1; (j)® = [(g+B)/26gl
In particlar, for 6 = 1, we have
(64) < -1 < r '^^ < 0 < r^^ < 1< r^^^
with r^ <-1 when C2 >0. Note that the output q^, and the corresponding
conjecture, r^, correspond to the Bresnahan "consistent conjecture
equilibrium only for 6= 1. C2 =0; for c^ ^ 0, the conjecture r^ is less
than minus one and differs from the Bresnahan conjecture.
To summarize the results of this section, we have found that:
(i) there are five rational-expectations solutions to the dynamic
duopoly problem, assuming S3mimetric solutions. If symmetry is
not assumed, there is an infinite set of solutions.
(ii) the Cournot solution is a rational-expectations solution when no
adjustment costs are present.
(iii) the Bertrand/Bresnahan competitive solution emerges as a
rational-expectations solution (q^) when marginal cost is
constant. However, this same solution (i.e., q^) corresponds
to output above the competitive level when the marginal cost
curve is positively sloped. In some sense, then, this is a
singular solution.
(iv) another rational expectations solution (q^^) corresponds' to
output levels below the competitive level but above the Cournot
level. Thus, the corresponding static conjecture, r^\(0, -1).
For any discount rates, the Cournot solution,'(q ) and (q - ) are
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dominated by one of the other rational-expectation solutions, in
terms of profits.
(v) of the remaining two rational-expectations solutions, q
corresponds to output levels between the Cournot and joint
monopoly solution, while q^^^ corresponds to an output level
below the monopoly level when discount rates are small (6 near
1), Which of these two solutions yields the higher profits
depends upon the discount rate,
(vi) as firms become more myopic (6 decreases), each solution tends
towards the Cournot level. In the limit (6 = 0), the Cournot
solution is the only rational-expectations solution.
In the next section, we reintroduce adjustment costs. Using these, we
show the Cournot solution is not a rational—expectations solution. We also
show that the rational expectations solution is a saddle-point, so that
there is one stable trajectory which describes the dynamic output of firms
outside of stationary equilibrium.
IV) The Role of Adjustment Costs
One of the most frequent criticisms aimed at duopoly models is that '•
they use assumptions which are inconsistent with the actual behavior of
firms. For example, the Cournot model is criticized because firms assume a ;
zero conjectural variation, yet each firm does adjust to changes in the
other firm's output level. The paper by Bresnahan, of course, is an attempt
to rectify this problem by trying to define and determine consistent conjec
tures. The conceptual problem with all of these analyses, however, is that
they are essentially static in nature. Since there is no intrinsic dynamic
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characteristic of the model, why should firms ever be away from equilibrium
output levels? Why don't they simply instantaneously adjust to the
equilibrium level? And, if firms are always in equilibrium, what is meant
by consistent conjectures?
In order to motivate why firms are ever out of equilibrium, and thus to
meaningfully discuss consistent conjectures or dynamic behavior, it seems
necessary to provide some mechanism which inhibits them from instantaneously
jumping to the equilibrium level. This could be done by ad hoc restrictions
OQ the level of output changes permitted in any period (treating output as a
state variable), or by introducing adjustment costs. The precise nature of
these costs is not crucial; the central point is that they provide a
rationale for explaining why equilibrium (steady-state) output levels do not
occur at all times.
In the last section we showed that, while we could derive 'rational
expectations" solutions, the only stable solution corresponded to stationary
output levels. The reason is clear - treating output as a state variable
was artificial, since it could be adjusted instantaneously and costlessly.
However, with adjustment costs, we can show that while we get similar
stationary-state results, we do find a true dynamic solution in which firms
are not always in equilibrium.
Conceptually, the symmetric rational expectations solutions are found
in precisely the same way for this case as they were in Section III. The
difficulty that arises is that the solution entails solving higher—order
polynomials, which cannot be solved explicitly. Thus, we need to resort to
computer simulations to characterize these solutions. However, it can
easily be shown that the Cournot case is no longer a rational-expectations
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solution. Thus, one of the solutions is degenerate, and there are only four
(symmetric) solutions for c^ 0»
Returning to the analysis of section II, recall that:
(27) (qp*" =[(h - a^K) +(C3 - e^K)qJ~^ - (R4.^)qj"Vx
Assuming symmetry, this implies:
(65) 4. = 1(^3 - 0K)/X]; 6 =
where X> 0 by the S.O.C. Thus, 0 = 0 implies tj) > 0 (c^ > 0), but <}) > 0
implies 0^0 (since K ^ 0), a contradiction. Similarly, assuming <f> = 0
leads to a contradiction. Hence, both (f) and 0 must be nonzero, and
consequently the Cournot solution cannot be a rational expectations
solution.
' The logic behind this is clear. Por c^ > 0, firm 1 knows that will
depend on since, at t, firm 1takes q^ as exogenous, it follows
t t t"" 1Immediately that, since q^ depends on must depend on well
as q^ By symmetry, then, each firm's output at t depends on the output
level of both firms at (t-1), and thus ((J), 0) ^ 0. Consequently, the
Cournot solution is a singular one, corresponding to the case in which no
real dynamic process is present. This mirrors the conventional criticism of
the Cournot process out of equilibrium - i.e., if firms are not In steady-
state equilibrium, the output adjustments are inconsistent, because they
ignore the interaction among firms. The presence of adjustment costs
provides a rationale for why firms do not Instantaneously jump to the static
equilibrium output levels, and thus these costs imply the Cournot solution
cannot be a rational expectations one.
Using (65), the definitions of K and X ((24) and (25)), and (32)-(34)
yield the equations that determine (p and 0:
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(66) B(1 - 60^)(0^ - (j)^) =C30[l - 2^^ - - 0^)]
(67) B[(|) + (0^-$^) {(l+6)( 1-6.1)^) + 6^())(6%^)}] = -gB [l-264.^-5^(t.^(e^-(fe^) I
Having solved for (((>,0) the value of a, and the corresponding output levels,
can be calculated using (23), (35), (36), and the symmetry assumption:
(68) = aj -s- a[X + K] = h
Unfortunately, it is not possible to present an analytic solution except for
the special case in which g = 2B, For this case it can be shown that a set
of solutions is given by;
(69) 0 =(1+0);C3(30^ + 20^) - B(2 +0)(1 + 20) =0.
Thus, there are three solutions: 6 > 0, 0e(O, -1/2), 0e(-3/2, -2). These
three solutions all yield the same equilibrium output level. Note, however,
that the characteristic roots of the difference equation system are given by
(0-0), (0+0). Since (0-0) = 1, and (046) > 1 for 0 > 0, (0-W) < -1 for
0£(-3/2, -2), the only root which yields a stable saddle point branch is the
root 0*e(O, -1/2). This root, of course, is the limiting solution for
c^ = 0, corresponding to the Bertrand/Bresnahan solution -0=0= 1/2, and
output produced at the competitive level (given constant marginal costs).
Kven for c^ 7^ 0, the steady-state output level for this case is the
coEopetitive level, with price equal to marginal cost. However, firms need
not start at this output level - there is one stable branch which
converges.
The other three solutions for (g = 2B) cannot be found analytically,
nor can any solutions be found analytically when g > 2B (marginal cost is
increasing). However, the corresponding solutions can readily be found by
numerical techniques. Some illustrative solutions are presented in
Table t.
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TABLE I: Solutions with Adjustment Costs*
^2 ^3
9^
i
q
0 0 .5 -.5 1.0 0 .5
0
o
o
•
.500 167 -.499833 1.0 .000334 .5
0 .1 .5157 17 -.484283 1.0 .03 1434 .5
0 1 .606599 -.393401 1.0 .2 13 198 ..5
1 0 .57735 -.57735 1. 15470 0 .379650
1 .001 .577453 -.577204 1. 154657 .000251 .378309
1 .1 .587220 -.563319 1.150539 .023901 .379466
1 1 .649685 -.475227 1. 124912 ,174458 .378296
^2 ^3
(\> +e
11
q
0 0 -.5 .5 -1.0 0 .3
0 .001 -.500332 .500665 -1,000997 .000333 .299880
0 .1 -.525855 .556970 -1.082825 .031115 .297180
0 1 -.580 195 .782651 -1.362846 .202456 .286099
1 0 -.57735 .57735 -1. 15470 0 .22904
1 .001 -.577439 .577689 -1. 155128 .000250 .22915
1 . 1 -.584784 • .608526 -1. 193310 .023742 .228 10
1 1 -.602270 .770351 -1.372521 i 168081 .22317
*Note: we assume B = 1, 6 = 1 for slmplicityi To obtain actual
output levels, multiply q* by (A-Cj).
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TABLE I - continued
^2 ^3
,iii
0
^iii ^iii
0 -0
iii
q
0 0 .866025 .866025 0 1^732050 . 105662
0 .001 .866048 .865051 .000997 1.731099 . 1057 18
6 . 1 .868589 .789184 .079405 1.657773 .111044
0 1 .887780 .546032 .341748 1.433812 .127133
1 0 .816496 .816496 0 1.632992 ,118350
1 .001 .816547 .816047 .000500 r. 632594 .118510
1 . 1 .821155 .776345 .044810 1.597500 . 119891
1 1 .847502 .593575 .253927 1.441077 .126705
IV iv iv .iv IV
0 0 -.866025 -.866025 0 -1.732050 .394338
0 .001 -.865715 -.866714 .000999 -1.732429 .394458
0 . 1 -.83694 1 -.926739 .089798 -1.763680 .400724
1 0 -.816496 -.816496 0 -1.632992 .281649
1 .001 -.816311 -.816810 .000499 -1.633121 .281326
1 . 1 -.799113 -.845462 .046349 -1.644575 .28329
1 1 -.707386 -.995225 .287839 -1.702511 .29264
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As is clear from the Table, for near zero, the adjustment costs do
not substantially alter any of these four solutions. Thus, these rational
expectations solutions are robust in the presence of adjustment costs; only
the Cournot solution vanishes. Furthermore, the presence of adjustment
costs, which provide a rationale for firms ever being out of equilibrium,
also yield a rational expectations solution which is dynamic in nature.
From (60), we know there are two roots, ((i)+0), and ((J)-e), to the dynamic
system. For c^ ~ 0, one of these roots is always zero, whereas the other
exceeds one in absolute value (except for the singular case of C2 ~ 0 and
the Bertrand solution). For ^ 0, however, one of these roots will be
nonzero, and less than one in absolute value, whereas the other root still
exceeds one in absolute value. In particular, when (p and 0 are of the same
sign, (t>+0 > 1, but (J)-0 < 1. Conversely, when <(> and 0 are of opposite
sign, the root ((j)+0) yields a stable trajectory.
Using the characteristic vector corresponding to each root, the stable
saddle-point branch for each solution is readily found:
(69i) q^j(t) =q^ + (q j(0) - q^)((|)+0)^ (^+0) >0
(69ii) q^^^(t) =q^^ + (qj(0) - q^^)((f. +0)^; q"(t) Eq^^Ct); (<p+d) >0
(69iii) q^^^^(t) =q^^^ + (q^(0) - E2q^^^ - q^^^Ct);
(<J)-0) > 0
(69iv) q^^(t) =q^^+(q j(O)-q^^)((f>-0)^; q2^(t:) =2q^^-q^^(t); (<1)^0) >0
As expected, convergence to equilibrium is monotonic. Of course, due to the
saddlepoint solution, the initial values cannot be chosen arbitrarily; for
cases (i) and (ii), the initial output of the two firms must be equal,
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whereas for cases (lii) and (iv), their sum must be equal to the total
steady-state output level.
To summarize the results of this section, we have found that if there
are adjustment costs:
(i) dynamic rational-expectations solution can be found.
(ii) the Cournot solution cannot be a rational expectations
solution,
(iii) the other four (symmetric) solutions are robust to the presence
of these costs.
(iv) the resulting solutions are saddle-point solutions, and thus
converge monotonically.
(v) however, the initial conditions cannot be chosen arbitrarily.
This is, of course, a problem, but seems inevitable in a
rational expectations framework.
Our final task is to see how our results are changed as the number of firms
increases.
V) Extension to N Firms
The preceeding analysis has assumed there are only two firms. However,
the analysis can readily be extended to deal with the case of N firms,
provided we maintain the assumption firms have identical cost functions and
that the rational-expectations solutions are symmetric. For analytical
simplicity, we further assume there is no discounting (5=1) and that there
are no adjustment costs (c^ =0).
Using the approach of section II, assume there are N firms, the output
of each being denoted by qj(t). Define:
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N
(70) 0(t) = Z q.(t); 0~^(t) = Q(t) - q (t)
j=l ^ ^
From the perspective of firm 1, we assume firm 1 believes all other firms
have identical reaction functions which, it assumes, are given by:
(71) qj (t) •= e+Y^j (t-1) +nO (^t-1); j =2, ... , N
Summing (7 1) over all j, not equal to 1, yields:
(72) Q~^(t) =a + (l)Q"^(t-l) + 0qj(t-l);
(73) a = (N-l)e; e = (N-l)n; (f, = y + (N-2)n
Equation (72) is of the same form as postulated in section II (equation 18);
thus, using the same methodology, we can derive firm l*s optimal rule:
(74) qj(t) =a + y'qj(t-l) +n'Q"\t-l)
A symmetric rational-expectations solution can then be found, as was done
earlier. Symmetry implies:
(75) n» = n = [0/(N-l)]; y' = Y = 4- - [ e(N-2)/(N-1) ]
a = e = [a/( N- 1) ]
As earlier, if there ace no adjustment costs, the Cournot solution is a
rational expectations solution. However, there are four other solutions,
corresponding to the cases discussed earlier. These are given by:
(76) e* = -4.*(N-1); ((J)*)^ = [(g-B)/NZj, where
(77) Z = BN + C2 > g. N > 2.
The corresponding output solutions for cases (i) and (il) are:
(78) q^ = (A - cpCl - .t.*)/[(B +2) - c{.*(BN +Z)]
(79) = (A - c^d + ^*)/[(B + Z) + (|)*(BN + Z)]
where (f)* is defined as the positive root of ((}>*) . The corresponding
values of 9^)» output, for cases (iii) and (iv) are:
\ At_t\1V2
(80) = 0^ = + B+Z
/
N-1
N
/
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(81) = (A - Cj)(l - [<i)^BN/(B + Z)])/(Z + BN)
(82) = (A - Cj)(l + [(})^BN/(B + Z)I)/(Z + BN)
As dlscused in Sections II and III, we can calculate the static
conjectural variations corresponding to each one of these solutions.
Assuming N identical firms, define the conjectural variation, r, as:
(83) r = OO'^/aq"-)
thus, r is the anticipated change in the output of all other firms due to a
change in q^. If all firms use the same conjecture, and have identical
costs, the equilibrium individual firm output is:
(84) q = (A - cp/[Z + Bd+r)]
Thus, the conjectures corresponding to each solution are given by (after
some simplification):
(85) = [(J)A(1 - N)/(l - ({>*)]; r^^ = [c()*(N - 1)/(1 + cf.*)]
(86) = [^^/(l - 4)^)]; r '^'^ = +0^)]
For N=2, these reduce to the same results given in Section III. As earlier,
1 i ^ V X iii N. Vr^ = -1 if c^ = 0; for c^ > 0, r"" < -1 (N > 1). Also, r >r > r ,
> 1, r^^e(0, -1), and r^^ > 0; for large N, r^^ > 1, provided > 0.
As N grows large, it is clear that the output of each firm tends to
zero. Total output, given by Nq is:
(87) lim[Nq^] = [(A - c^/B]; x = i, ii, iv
N-^
(88) lira[Nq^^^] = 0
N-^
Thus, for case iii (which corresponds to output levels below joint profit
maximization), total output level actually falls, and tends to zero, as the
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number of firms grows large. For the other three cases, total output
expands, and price approaches c j. as3rn!ptotlcally, the competitive
equilibrium price if no fixed costs are present. Asymptotically, the
conjectures are given by:
(89) lim r^ = -[(g-B)/B] < -1; lim r^^ = [(g-B)/B] > 1,
with strict inequality for C2 f 0. Thus, as Ngrows large, r^ remains
less than minus one, while r^^ exceeds one, provided c^ >0. For the other
two cases:
(90) lim r^^^ = lim r^^ = -(1/2)
Note that even as the number of firms grows, the conjectures do not approach
zero, the Cournot case.
/
Tf there are no fixed costs, then the competitive equilibrium is given
by P = c^; if marginal costs are constant (C2 = 0), firm size - and
hence the number of firms - is indeterminate. If C2 > 0, then the
competitive equilibrium entails a "large" number" of firms, each producing an
infinitessimal output.
For the rational expectations solutions, if the number of firms is
determined endogenously - by the condition profits are zero - we get
analogous results except for case (ill). If marginal costs are constant,
case (i) - the Bertrand solution - always yields the competitive solution,
regardless of the number of firms. The Cournot solutions, and cases (ii)
and (iv) also yield the competitive solution asymptotically, as N grows
large. Even if C2 > 0, these solutions all yield the competitive solution
asymptotically. However, note that case (ill) does not converge to the
competitive solution - instead, aggregate output shrinks towards zero.
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If fixed costs are present, the situation is a bit more complex. Let
the representative firm's total cost curve be given by:
(91) TC =Cq + CjQ + (.c^q^/2)
Then average total costs are minimized at:^
(92) q* = [acg/c^] '^'^ ; Mln(ATC) = =P*
Thus, the competitive long-run price is given by P*, the output of each firm
by q* and the number of firms, N*, by [(A - BP*)/q*J.
The zero-profit (free-entry) oligopoly solution depends on r, the
conjecture* Given r, and the number of firms, individual firm output is
given by (84). If the condition of zero profits is imposed on this
oligopoly equilibrium, the resulting solution is given by:
(93) q' = [2c^/(c2 + 2B(1+r))]^^^;
P' =Cj+ [2 '^'^ (CgC2 +B(l+r))/,(cQC2 +2CpB( 1+r)) ]
For r = -1, this is the same solution as the competitive equilibrium.
Finally, note:
(94) q* ^ q* as r
Returning to our rational-expectations solution, note that none of them
yields the competitive equilibrium (see Ruffin (197 1) for similar results).
Case (i) implies r = -1 only if = 0; but for = 0, c^ > 0, profits will
always be negative and hence this cannot be a viable rational expectations
solution. For the other four cases (including the Cournot case), r > -1.
If c^ >0, then r^ <-1, whereas the conjectures corresponding to the other
four cases exceed Mnus one. Thus, the zero-profit rational expectations
solution corresponding to case (i) corresponds to individual firms producing
output levels greater than those corresponding to efficient production,
whereas the other four cases correspond to the traditional Chamberlain
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result of excess capacity. These results are summarized graphically in
Figure I.
To summarize the results of this section, we have found that:
(i) the analysis of prior sections can readily be extended to more
than two firms.
. (ii) if no adjustment costs are present, there are five symmetric
rational-expectations solutions.
(iii) if marginal costs are constant, the Bertrand solution (r = -I)
is a viable long-run solution only if there are no fixed costs
(the same is true of a competitive equilibrium).
(iv) if no fixed costs are present, then all of the rational expecta
tions solutions - except case (iii) -converge to the competi
tive equilibrium. For case (iii), aggregate output levels
converge to zero.
(v) if fixed costs are present, and marginal cost is increasing, so
that the firm cost curve is U-shaped, none of the rational
expectations solutions converge to the competitive equilibrium,
(vi) with U-shaped cost curves, all of the rational-expectations
solutions - except for case (i) - yield the standard monopolis
tic competition results of firms* having excess capacity. The
excess capacity per firm is smallest for case (iv), whereas it
is largest for case (iii).
(vii) finally, there is one rational-expectations solution -
case (i) - in which firms produce above the optimal output
level; thus, a zero-profit solution does not necesarily entail
excess firm capacity. This result is similar to one of
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Figure I: Rational Expectations Solutions with Free Entry*
ATC
f f r f f
*Notes: q* is the competitive solution
q is the Cournot solution
q* corresponds to the other rational expectations solutions
f
32
Derasetz's (1959) solutions in which advertising costs are
present.
VI) Summary and Conclusions
Most criticisms of standard duopoly models focus on the inconcsistency
between assumptions and actual behavior when firms are out of equilibrium.
We have argued that this criticism is not a valid one, since the underlying
models of the firm are static in nature, and thus there is no reason for the
firm to ever be out of equilibrium. Consequently, we believe that it is
necessary to specify a dynamic model of the firm in order to derive fully
consistent rational-expectations solutions.
The model we have constructed in this paper is a relatively simple one.
Its dynamic characteristics are derived from two assumptions: (i) the
presence of output adjustment costs, and (ii) the assumed reaction function.
Using this set-up, we have shown how (a multiplicity of) rational-expecta-
tions solutions can be derived. We have also seen that the Cournot solution
is a rational-expectations solution, provided no adjustment costs are
present. If adjustment costs occur, the model is truly dynamic in nature,
and the Cournot solution ceases to be a rational-expectations one. However,
there are four other S5rmmetrlc rational expectations solutions, as well as
an infinity of asymmetric solutions. Furthermore, it is possible to specify
a true dynamic solution for each of these cases.
Of the four (non-Cournot) rational-expectations solutions, we have
shown that one yields output levels above the competitive solution (when
marginal cost is positively sloped), while a second yields output levels
below the joint profit-maximization level. If,there is free entry, we have
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chat Che competitive equilibrium will not, in general, be a rational-
expectations one. One surprising result that emerges is a monopolistic
competitive solution in which firms produce at output levels above optimal
capacity, the reverse of the usual Chamberlain-type result.
The model, and the postulated form of the reaction function, that we
have used are quite simplistic. Itoreover, we have ignored strategic
behavior by firms, aimed at attempts to discover - or alter - the reaction
functions of other firms. Extending the analysis in this direction would
certainly be useful. The presence, however, of multiple solutions may
indicate the inherent nonuniqueness of duopoly solutions. It would be
interesting to see if other dynamic rational-expectations solutions yield
the same problem of nonuniqueness.
I am endebted to Walter Enders, Roy Gardner, and Arnold Faden for very
helpful comments and suggestions. Naturally, any errors are solely my
responsibility.
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FOOTNOTES
r = r = -1, and c.„ = c.. = 0, the system Is singular - total
1 j j 1 iz j z
output is determinate, but individual firm output is Indeterminate.
^hile we treat the parameters (a^ , cj) j, 0^) as known, little would be
changed - due to the quadratic profit function - by assuming they are
random, with known distributions.
3
Allowing the intercept terms on the marginal cost schedules to differ
would be relatively trivial, since these do not affect the determination of
the (J)*s and 6*s. If the slope of the marginal cost curve differ across
firms, the numerical analysis becomes quite tedious. However, there is no
conceptual difficulty involved in assuming the firms are asymmetric.
If 6 « 1, C2 = Oj then for <|> » -0, ^ = 1/2, and
^Of course, for 6-1, the function V* is not convergent. However,
overtaking principles can be used. Furthermore, it is clear the solution is
continuous in 6.
^If =0, there is no competitive solution for Cq >0, as the optimal
solution entails having only one firm produce output.
^2 = 1.
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